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Statement of Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction because Mr.
Leiva-Perez was convicted of a first degree felony. § 78A-3-102(3)(i), U.C.A.
The Supreme Court has the authority, and did transfer the case to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to§ 78A-3-102(4), U.C.A., 2009.
Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review
Issue I: Whether the Court erred in denying Mr. Leiva-Perez's Motion to
Suppress his statement on the ground that it was involuntarily given.
Standard of Review: Factual findings made by the Court are reviewed on a clearly
erroneous standard, the application of the law to the facts under a "correctness,"
standard. State v. Curry~ 147 P.3d 483,485

,s

(Utah Ct. App. 2006). Questions

of Constitutional Law and reviewed on a "correctness" standard. Id.
Issue II: Whether the Court committed plain error in asking the Defendant in front
of the Jury if he wanted to testify.
Standard of Review: Because this issue involves a Fifth Amendment
Constitutional Issue which was not preserved by objection below, to raise it for the
first time on appeal, Appellant must demonstrate plain error. State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Plain error requires that
the error should have been obvious to the trial Court, and that the error affected the
substantial rights of the Appellant. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah
1989).
1

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
Any such provisions of law are set out in the various other sections of the
brief, as warranted.
Statement of the Case
Mr. Leiva-Perez was charged by Information with Murder, a first degree
felony, in violation of §76-5-203, U.C.A. (Rl-2). (See also, Information, attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Addendum A).
His counsel filed a Motion to Suppress his statements to law enforcement
which was extensively briefed. (R33-66). That Motion was denied. (Rl52-183).
The statements, a transcript of an interview, and the translation of a written
statement by Appellant were admitted at trial (R409, trial exhibit 38 and 39).
Mr. Leiva-Perez was convicted at jury trial (R366) and sentenced to fifteen
years to life in the Utah State Prison. (R386-388). He is presently in custody of
the Utah Department of Corrections. (See, Judgment and Order of Commitment,
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Addendum B).
Facts Relevant to the Appeal
David Urrutea (hereinafter "David," or "the victim") invited his cousin, the
Appellant, Jose Leiva-Perez, to come stay with him outside Fort Duchesne, in
Uintah County, Utah. (R404, pg. 9-15). Appellant left his native Guatemala, and
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entered the United States through Texas, and made his way to Utah. (R39, pg. 2).
He lived with his cousin in a twenty-two foot by seven and a half foot camp trailer
for about a month before David Urrutea ended up dead. (R403, pg. 414, line 1618).
January 3th, 2013, David Urrutea went to work and clocked out about 5:30
p.m. A short while later, about 6:00 p.m., he called a friend and left a message.
(R403, pg. 474, line16-22; R404, pg. 659, line 21, through pg. 660, line 7).
When the friend, who lived in the same trailer park, called him back, David never
answered. (R403, pg. 403, pg. 473, lines 8-13; pg. 475, lines 1-16). The friend
noticed that David's red Nissan truck was missing, but she thought nothing of it,
because David had told her he intended to go visit his sister in Ogden. (R403, pg.
475, lines 8-25).
On January 61\ 2013, the Appellant called David Urrutea's sister Sandra in
California and told her she should check on David, that three or four men entered
the camp trailer and severely beat David with a bat. Mr. Leiva-Perez told Sandra
an ambulance and/or fire trucks had come to David's aid and he was in the
hospital. (R403, pg. 381 line 7, through pg. 382, line 6).

After that phone call,

Sandra was no longer able to reach Mr. Leiva-Perez, as he quit answering his
phone. (R403, pg. 381, lines 5-13).

Sandra made calls attempting to find her brother by making calls to
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hospitals and authorities who would be able to confirm or refute whether
emergency vehicles were dispatched to David's trailer. They were not able to
confirm any emergency vehicles were dispatched to the scene, and testimony at
trial was to the effect that no emergency vehicles were called to the scene. (R403,
pg. 382, line 21 through pg. 383, line 3).
Sandra' a sister, Consuela, lived in Utah, and arrived in Uintah County as
soon as she could after being informed by Sandra of Mr. Leiva-Perez's report
about David and the inability to reach or find him. (R403, pg. 398 line 4, through
pg. 400, line 20).
Consuela obtained assistance from law enforcement to do a welfare check
at David Urrutea's trailer. (R403, pg. 390, lines 19-25). His truck was gone, and
the door, which had a deadbolt that could either be locked from the inside by
turning the lock mechanism, or from the outside by using the key, was locked.
(R403, pg. 392, lines 21-250. Peaking in the window, the first responding officer
was able to see what appeared to be blood spattered on various surfaces. From
another window, the officer was able to see a body laying face down on the floor.
(R403, pg. 390, line 13, through pg. 391, line 19).
The officer made forced entry into the trailer and confirmed that the male
individual on the floor was deceased, and in fact frozen solid, as the temperature
was a bitterly cold 20 degrees below zero. (R403, pg. 392, line 21 through pg.
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393, line 6; R404, pg. 631, line 4-6).
The Utah State Crime lab processed the scene and removed the body for
autopsy by the medical examiner. It was noted that there was blood spatter on
surfaces behind the end of a couch/bed and overhead, and there was blood on a
comforter at that end of the couch/bed, which would be consistent with David
having been laying down with his head at that end of the couch/bed when he was
struck. It was testified to that the blood on the wall behind the end of the
bed/couch may been ejected there when the victim was struck, or perhaps flung off
an instrument being used to strike the victim. (R403, pg. 418 line 13, through pg.
420, line 22).
The victim was actually frozen to the floor in a pool of blood with his right
arm tucked underneath his chest, and his left arm slightly overhead. (R405, pg.

524, line 5-6). There was no evidence of any defensive wounds indicating the
victim had fought back or struggled against the attack. (R405, pg. 521, line 1,
through pg. 523, line 15; R405, pg. 536, line 5-19) .. While small the interior of
the trailer did not show signs of a struggle as things were not tossed about,
knocked over, or broken. (R403, pg. 432 line 18, through pg. 432, line 2; R404,
pg. 15-25).
The bloody items were collected from the trailer house by the crime lab
team, although a metal rod was left behind, as it did not appear to have any signs
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of blood on it. (R403, pg. 423 lines 3-18). The interior area around the door,
including the deadbolt lock, showed no signs of any blood.
The medical examiner testified that David Urrutea had been struck about
five times, and died of blunt force trauma. All wounds were to his head, and one
fracture to his skull ran basically from the victim's eye to the back of his ear, and
caused bone fragments to enter his brain. A blow to the victim's mouth left some
of his teeth broken, which were still in the victim's mouth at the time of the
autopsy. (404, pg. 519, line 15-16; R405, pg. 523, line 24-25). The medical
examiner testified that one blow appeared to be "U" shaped. (R405, line 7,
through pg. 535, line 23). The medical examiner testified that he did not believe
Mr. Urrutea could have spoken after being struck, (R405, line 1-4) and that while

there was blood in the victim's lungs, indicating he had breathed in some blood
after the attack, he likely did so while unconscious. (R405, pg. 544 line 9,
through pg. 545, line 20).
Mr. Leiva-Perez was arrested in the Moreno Valley in California. David
Urrutea's truck was also found abandoned in California. Mr. Leiva-Perez was
transported back to Uintah County. (R404, pg. 644, line 18, through pg. 645, line
9). At the time he was transported back, he had a fairly severe infection in his foot
which was a lingering injury he had suffered upon his entry into the United States
months before. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 2-3). He was treated with penicillin for
the infection in his foot, and was housed in the Uintah County jail infirmary when
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he was approached for an interview. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 3-4).
Because Mr. Leiva-Perez is a Spanish speaker, a Spanish-speaking F.B.I.
Agent, Agent Ryan, assigned to the Uintah Basin, assisted in the interview.
Because Agent Ryan had not really been involved in the investigation, case agent
Leonard Isaacson sat in. The two law enforcement agents spoke to each other
during the interview so that they could jointly handle the interrogation in light of
their individual skills and knowledge of the investigation.
Mr. Leiva-Perez, who has a second or third grade education, asked for
blankets, as he was cold during the interview. Agent Ryan also observed the room
was cold. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 20). Mr. Leiva-Perez seemed eager to talk to
the officers, and in fact, when he started speaking, Agent Ryan told him not to
talk, and the Agent then explained Mr. Leiva-Perez's Miranda rights. (R409,
exhibit 39, pg. 3-4). Mr. Leiva-Perez indicated he wished to talk and did not ask
for an attorney.
Mr. Leiva-Perez advised that three male individuals who he identified by
first name, physical description, and that they were co-workers of the victim
(R409, exhibit 39, pg. 27) came to the trailer in a black SUV at a time Mr. LeivaPerez was outside the trailer. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 28). Appellant relayed that
the men entered the trailer and beat David. Mr. Leiva-Perez explained that the
dispute the men had with David Urrutea stemmed from the fact that some or all of
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the men were sleeping with the same loose woman. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 4-7; pg.
13-14; pg. 29). When Mr. Leiva-Perez entered the trailer after the men left, he
asserted that his cousin David insisted that Appellant leave and take David's truck,
and leave it where he wished. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 34-35). According to Mr.
Leiva-Perez, David Urrutea did not want to drag his cousin into his dispute with
these men, nor did he wish for him to get in trouble, in light of his
"undocumented" status. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 8-10; pg. 15-16). Mr. LeivaPerez claimed that he called for help, and fire trucks arrived to help the victim.
(R409, exhibit 39, pg. 30-31).
Mr. Leiva-Perez then indicated that he stopped and conversed with a
friend in Roosevelt before going back to the scene of the trailer, and seeing no fire
trucks, (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 30; pg. 32) Mr. Leiva-Perez did not reenter the
trailer to see if Mr. Urrutea had been removed.
The Agent told Mr. Leiva-Perez that he did not believe him, and
confronted him that it was a lie that he called police, fireman or an ambulance for
his dying cousin. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 37). The Agent threatened to leave the
interview rather than listen to more lies. The Agent then asserted "If you don't
want to say the truth, the, the, the penalty, that's how you say it? The penalty will
be worse. The punishment will be worse, okay? You can say the truth, explain
what happened and they can work with you when the time comes to go see a
judge. It will be less charges." (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 38). Mr. Leiva-Perez
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maintained three people did show up to the trailer and that he did not kill his
cousin, to which the Agent maintained that it was obvious they were not being told
the truth. The officer urged, "there is also a difference with the law, there is a
difference with someone who admits what happened instead of hiding the truth.
That is the help we can offer. We can tell the judge, the attorney that, 'Look, he
told us the truth, maybe not at first, but he told us the truth."' (R409, exhibit 39,
pg. 40). Further, the Agent indicated, "this is your opportunity to be honest y
(sic) show the judge and the court that you want to repent and leave everything
behind." (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 41).
Mr. Leiva-Perez then told the officers a different version of events in
which David Urrutea got angry with Mr. Leiva-Perez because he had not gotten a
job, and that because the victim had rifles, Mr. Leiva-Perez admitted striking the
victim "like three times," with a bar, but because the victim said he would kill Mr.
Leiva-Perez. (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 41-44; pg. 46). Asked ifhe could draw the
iron bar he used to strike the victim, Mr. Leiva-Perez said, "no." (R409, exhibit
39, pg. 45-46).
After the interview in which Mr. Leiva-Perez indicated he struck the
victim with a metal bar, police wrote another search warrant and retrieved the
metal bar which had been observed in the initial processing of the crime scene, but
left behind. (R404, pg. 649, line 21, through pg. 650, line 1).
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The recording of the interview was translated into English and the
transcript of that interview was admitted at trial (after Mr. Leiva-Perez's counsel
was unsuccessful in having it suppressed). (R409, exhibit 39).
Mr. Leiva-Perez was provided a form on which to write a written statement
which the Agent said would be shown to the Judge, which he did, in Spanish.
(R409, exhibit 39, pg. 51). It was translated into English and also admitted at
trial. (R409, exhibit 38). That statement was addressed to "mister judge," and
asks for forgiveness, and indicates that "what happened with my cousin was to
save my life .. .I did it in self-defense, he was going to kill me ... " (R409, exhibit
38).
In front of the Jury (R405, pg. 755, line15) the defense rested. (R405, pg.
757, line 25). The Court then asked ,"Okay, are you going to call your client?" to
which defense counsel replied, "No." The Court continued, "Have you talked to
him about his right to testify, to make the selection to testify even if you told him
you didn't think it was a good idea?" Trial counsel responded, "We're talked
about it, but we probably need to do that again on the record. I'm wondering ifwe
could do that" to which the Court interrupted, "outside the presence of the jury?"
R405, pg. 758, line 1-9.
Mr. Leiva-Perez did not testify. However, a Dr. Furlong, who is a college
professor and learned in the area of Latin American countries, and their political
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and justice systems, testified. He explained to the jury that Mr. Leiva-Perez's
native Guatemala has a "guilty until proven innocent," system. Further, he
testified that corruption is rampant there, and that a system of "personalism" is in
effect. "Personalism" is characterized by preferential treatment for criminal
defendants who know someone powerful (like a judge), or have someone to
intercede for them who knows the judge. Wherefore, the Doctor opined that the
assertions that the Agent would tell the Judge something to benefit Mr. LeivaPerez would have been particularly meaningful and persuasive to Mr. LeivaPerez in light of his understanding of how things worked in Guatemala. R404, pg.
579-622).

Summary of Arguments
Issue I: Whether the Court erred in denying Mr. Leiva-Perez's Motion to
Suppress his statement on the ground that it was involuntarily given.
Mr. Leiva-Perez is an uneducated native Guatemalan, Spanish-speaking
individual. When interviewed by police, he was suffering from an infection, and
was physically uncomfortable in a cold infirmary cell.
The political and criminal justice system in Guatemala is characterized by
corruption, and "personalism" in which favors and concession are granted to
criminal defendants depending on whether they know the Judge, or someone who
knows the Judge will intercede on the defendant's behalf.

II

The Agent interrogating Mr. Leiva-Perez indicated that he would get
harsher punishment and/or that there are things that can be done, intercession
which could be made with the attorneys and Judge for persons who repented. Mr.
Leiva-Perez then altered the version of events he had previously told officers, to
include that he used physical force against the victim, striking him "like three
times" with a metal bar, in self defense.
Promises ofleniency/threats of harsher punishment serve to make a
confession involuntary, when, combined with other factors, they induce a
defendant to confess when he otherwise would not have. In this case, the
combined effect of Mr. Leiva-Perez's lack of education, illness, uncomfortable
environs, and working knowledge that someone approaching the Judge on one's
behalf was effective in achieving favorable results induced a confession from Mr.
Leiva-Perez when it was clear that he otherwise would not have implicated
himself in the killing of his cousin.

Issue II: Whether the Court committed plain error in asking the Defendant in front
of the Jury if he wanted to testify.
The defense rested in front of the Jury. Rather than excusing the Jury to
have any discussion the Court felt needed to be had, the Court stated, "Okay, are
you going to call your client?" to which defense counsel replied, "No." The
Court continued further, "Have you talked to him about his right to testify, to
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make the selection to testify even if you told him you didn't think it was a good
idea?"
While issues of commentary on the right to silence are most often brought
up in allegations against the State, the Court is not entitled to place undue
emphasis or present commentary on the right to silence in front of the jury.
The comments made by the Judge, particularly after the defense rested it's
case, the additional information presented to the Jury, that would lead the Jury to
understand that if the Defendant really wanted to tell his side of the story, even his
learned counsel could not overrule him and keep him off the stand was such an
unfair comment on the defendant's silence, the error should have been obvious to
the Judge.
Arguments
Issue I: Whether the Court erred in denying Mr. Leiva-Perez's Motion to
Suppress his statement on the ground that it was involuntarily given.
"Threats or promises render a confession involuntary if, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, they overcome a defendant's free will." State v.
Arriaga-Luna~ 311 P.3d 1028, 1032,r11 (Utah 2013), citing, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S., 279,285 (1991). The right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination is guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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Factors to be examined regarding voluntariness of a confession may include
t:.·

the defendant's age, level of education, and level of intelligence. Schneckloth vs.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Trickery or deception on the part of the
officers, withholding of requested family or counsel, or threats of harsher
punishment or promises of leniency are also factors which may bear on whether a
confess is voluntary. State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999), State v.
Werner, 76 P.3d 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), State v. Bunting, 51 P.3d 37 (Utah
Ct. App. 2002).
Promises of leniency if the person confesses imply threats of harsher
punishment ifhe will not. State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1017-1018
(Utah 1999). See also, State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-226 (Utah 1989) Strain
holds that if a confession is invoked due to promises of leniency, the confession is
to be excluded.
While the police may inform the defendant of the charges and punishment
he may realistically face State v. Montero, 191 P.3d 828, 832 ,r14 (Utah Ct. App.
2008) the interrogator went far beyond that in this case, and ultimately overcame
Appellant's will by threatening more severe punishment ifhe did not confess.
Examining the facts of this case, it is obvious that Mr. Leiva-Perez
maintained that three people showed up to the trailer and beat his cousin. He
repeated that version of events several times, and gave a description of the vehicle,

14

~

the persons involved, their names (or nicknames), their physical descriptions, and
their workplace. (R409, exhibit 39). It was only after the officers confronted Mr.
Leiva-Perez with their belief that he was lying, their assertion that punishment
would be harsher ifhe was lying, and that the Judge could be communicated with
ifhe accepted responsibility, that Mr. Leiva-Perez knuckled under and told a
version of events in which he physically struck the victim. As outlined in
Rettenberger, here the manipulation of the combination of threats of harsher
punishment, a promise that there could be leniency, and that the Judge would be
contacted on communicated with on Mr. Leiva-Perez's behalf that induced the
Appellant to change his version of events and ultimately confess. Rettenberger, at
1016, citing, State v. Regelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986).
In the interview, the F .B.I. Agent specifically tells Mr. Leiva-Perez his
punishment will be "worse," if he doesn't confess, and that there will be "less
charges," if he confesses (R409, exhibit 39, pg. 38). The Agent asserted that there
is a "difference in the law," for persons who confess, and that the officers can
intercede with the Judge and attorneys to help the defendant. (R409, exhibit 39,
pg. 40-41).
The Court could interpret these statements as efforts by law enforcement to
deceive Mr. Leiva-Perez, because there certainly is no mechanism whereby
officers go to a Judge and inform the Judge of a defendant's confession, assert to
the Judge a level of repentance, and request leniency. Agent Ryan testified that
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while he was not aware of any "differences" in Utah law for defendants who "told
the truth" that in the federal system where he works, there can be sentencing
reductions for acceptance of responsibility. (R405, pg. 751, line 21, through pg.
753, line 22). Whether it was the Agent's intent to deceive or trick Mr. LeivaPerez into changing this version of events, certainly the effect that it would have
on Mr. Leiva-Perez is unmistakable.
Mr. Leiva-Perez was inarguably uneducated, and unsupported. The
testimony of the expert, Dr. Furlong, indicated that Mr. Leiva-Perez's upbringing
in Guatemala would have left him with a strong conviction that persons who can
get someone to intercede with a Judge on their behalf would get leniency, and
those who could not would fall through the cracks, and potentially be incarcerated
indefinitely without trial.
Accordingly, this Court should find that based on the totality of
circumstances, the statement was involuntary, and that the trial court erred in not
suppressing it.
Issue II: Whether the Court committed plain error in asking the Defendant in front
of the Jury ifhe wanted to testify.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides protection
against self compelled incrimination. "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Due

16

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits mention or commentary
on invocation of the right to remain silence because such commentary impairs the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 806 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998).
Griffin v. California holds that," ... either comment by the prosecution on
the accused's silence or instruction by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt," violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion states,
" ... within the federal judicial system the Fifth Amendment bars adverse comment
by federal prosecutors and judges on a defendant's failure to take the stand in a
criminal trial, a right according him by that amendment." Id.
In State of Utah v. Nomeland, the Court held that the standard which
applies to the State's alleged improper comment on the accused right to remain
silent is the same standard which should be applied to instructions given by the
Judge. State v. Nomeland, 581 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Utah 1978). Though the
conversation initiated by the Court was not an instruction, the same standards
should be applied to the Judge's comments as would be applied to improper
comments on silence made by the State.
" ... [A] prosecutor commits constitutional error when his statement is
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'manifestly intended or 'is' of such character that a jury would naturally and
necessarily construe it to amount to a comment on the failure of the accused to
testify'." State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1982), citations omitted.
Typically comment on silence issues are presented in circumstances in
which the State has asked questions or made comment about the accused's
invocation of the right to remain silent. This case presents an unusual variation of
the issue in which the Court stressed the issue in front of the jury despite defense
counsel having just said he rested his case.
At least at it pertains to situations where the State has elicited information
about a defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent, the mere mention of it
is not sufficient to demonstrate a due process violation, the State must in some
way use the silence to undermine the right to invoke. Id. In this case, the State
did not run afoul of the requirement not to elicit testimony regarding Mr. LeivaPerez's invocation of his right to remain silent. However, the Court went out of its
way to press the issue of the invocation directly and explicitly, and despite the fact
defense counsel said he rested.
The prohibition against commentary on the right to silence is
grounded in the improper suggestion it leaves with the jury, the courting of
nagging speculation about what would have been said, solicitation of the
natural human curiosity which demands an explanation. It is a reasonable
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assumption that the jury in Mr. Leiva-Perez's case would have been
particularly curious about what he would've said had he testified in light of
the fact that it was a murder case, the victim was Mr. Leiva-Perez's cousin,
and it had been demonstrated that the accused had previously given an
interview which was in parts demonstrably untrue, and internally
inconsistent.
"[T]he constitutional line is crossed only when a remark or an
accumulation of remarks present what can fairly be characterized as an over
reference to a defendant's failure to testify." State v. Nguyen, 246 P.3d
535, 544 131 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). It seems that the Court had some
cognizance that the matter should not be discussed in front of the jury in
that when defense counsel hesitated when the issue was brought up, the
Court suggested that further colloquy be conducted outside the presence of
the jury. However, the issue had already been highlighted and emphasized
in front of the jury, the bell could not be "unrung," and the accumulated
comments "present what can fairly be characterized as an overt reference to
[Mr. Leiva-Perez's] failure to testify." Id. "It is error of a nature that
should be obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the wellestablished general rule prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a
defendant's post-Miranda silence." State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293,
1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing, State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993), Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610-617-20 (1976), and
State of Utah v. Wiswell. 639 P.2d 146-147 (Utah 1981). If such an error
is to be viewed as "obvious" to the trial court when the State commits it,
said error should be viewed as obvious to the trial court when the trial court
commits it.
In this case, the Judge not only asked in front of the Jury whether
Mr. Leiva-Perez's trial counsel would be calling him as a witness, it was

after the defense rested. When told "no," the Court persisted and asked,
"Have you talked to him about his right to testify, to make the selection to
testify even if you told him you didn't think it was a good idea?" It should
have been obvious to the trial court that the comments were causing
emphasis to be placed on Mr. Leiva-Perez's invocation to his right to
silence. The Court's comments even served to needlessly inform the Jury
about the nuances that the individual defendant may "override," his
counsel's opinion and advice that it might be better not to testify.
Because the effect of the discussion in front of the jury constituted
and unfair and prohibited comment on Mr. Leiva-Perez's invocation of this
right not to take the stand and testify, the Court should reverse.
Conclusion
Wherefore, Appellant, Jose Leiva-Perez prays this Court reverse the
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conviction and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate in the
premises. 1
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of July, 20

1

Counsel certifies this brief is in a mono-spaced font, with proper margins, and
contains under 425 lines and under 4950 words (including footnotes, but excluding
indexes and addenda) and thus complies with Rule 24, U.R.A.P. (f)(l)(A).
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G. Mark Thomas, #6664
Uintah County Attorney
641 East 300 South, Suite 200
Vernal, UT 84078
mark@uintahcountyattorney.org
Telephone: ( 4 35) 7 81-542 9
Fax:
(435) 781-5428

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION

vs.
Case No.
JOSE
JOSE
JOSE
JOSE
DOB:

EDUARDO LEIVA-PEREZ aka
LEVIA-PEREZ aka
LEIVA aka
PEREZ
01/11/1979,

Judge

1:3/tf"tJODJ:30

Mccld(an

Defendant.
The undersigned G.

Mark Thomas,

and belief that the defendant,

states on information

in Uintah County,

State of Utah,

committed the crimes of:
Count 1:
MURDER (2955), in violation of Utah Code Ann. §765-203, a First Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about
January 03, 2013, in Uintah County, the defendant did
(a) intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, commit
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of
another;
(c} acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference
to human life, knowingly engage in conduct which created a grave
risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of another;
(d) (i} engage in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of
any predicate offense, or was a party to the predicate offense;
and (ii) a person other than a party as defined in Utah Code
13-2003 I

1

••

, . · . • · - - · ~ - -.....

Section 76-2-202 was killed in the course of the commission,
attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and (iii) the
actor acted with the intent required as an element of the
predicate offense;
(e) recklessly cause the death of a peace officer or military
service member in uniform while in the commission or attempted
commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Utah Code Section
76-5-102.4;
{ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful
arrest under Section 76-8-305, having used force against a peace
officer; or
{iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform
under Utah Code Section 76-5-102.4;
(f) commit a homicide which would have been aggravated murder,
but the offense was reduced pursuant to Utah Code Subsection 765-202(4); or
(g} commit aggravated murder, but special mitigation was
established under Utah Code Section 76-5-205.5.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witness: Leonard Isaacson
Dated this

10th day of January, 2013.

G. Mark Thomas
Uintah County Attorney

13-2003 /
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AddendumB

Judgment and Order of Commitmet
filed November 30th, 2014

The Order of Court is stated below:

Dated: November 30, 2014
04: 18: 11 PM

At the dir~tti<>'n.iof:.
•' ~\ .·· ..
Clark N. Ivlclill.ellan \
District
,-.;--:,",,f,;,.,'•.·✓,. ~

cd~\u~~ ·}

by

\~J:f~~?\:,- ,/

Isl TILL SHBP.FIEJSD>···
_,...,,,,.,,1,,.
District Court Clerk
G. Mark Thomas, #6664
County Attorney
641 East 300 South, Suite 200
Vernal, UT 84078
mark@uintahcountyattorney.org
Phone: (435) 781-5436 - Fax: (435) 781-5428

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSE LEIVA-PEREZ,
DOB: 01/11/1979,
Defendant.

OFFENSE:
LEVEL:

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT
[UTAH STATE PRISON]

Case No. 131800050
Judge Clark A. McClellan

COUNT 1 : MURDER

First Degree Felony

THIS MATTER came on regularly before the Court for sentencing
November 5th, 2014, the Defendant having previously been found guilty
of the above set forth offense(s), the Honorable Clark A. McClellan
presiding.

The Defendant was personally present and was represented

by his attorney of record, Gregory M. Lamb.

The State was represented

by G. Mark Thomas.
The Court received and reviewed a Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report from the Department of Corrections.

The Defendant received and

reviewed the same Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, and admitted
there were no inaccuracies, or was furnished the opportunity to have a
hearing to challenge any claimed inaccuracies.

With no legal reason

having been shown why judgment and sentencing should not be
pronounced, the Court entered Judgment as follows:
That the Defendant, Jose Leiva-Perez, is hereby adjudged to be
guilty of the following offense(s):

047002621/S13-0065
GMT/gb

COUNT 1 : MURDER

Level: First Degree Felony
Statute: Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203
The Defendant is hereby sentenced to be confined in prison and/or
jail, as follows:
COUNT 1: 15 Years to Life in the Utah State Prison

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

The

Defendant

County

Sheriff

is

forthwith

for

remanded

transportation

to
to

the
the

custody
Utah

of

State

the

Uintah

Prison

and

execution of the sentence(s) given herein.
\...-_

DATED this

day of

- - - - - - - -,

2014.

Clark A. McClellan
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/s/ Gregory M. Lamb
Attorney for Defendant
Signed by G. Mark Thomas with permission of Gregory M. Lamb
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